A Transactional Legacy: Why Nitish Kumar and Bihar’s Muslims Never Aligned

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The recent political climate within the NDA, coupled with the possibility of this being Nitish Kumar’s final term as Chief Minister, has brought a long-standing question to the forefront of Bihar’s political discourse: the ambiguous relationship between Nitish Kumar and the Muslim community.

This question is now being asked with renewed urgency, driven by recent actions that have prompted the Muslim community to question whether he is a “friend or foe.” The JDU’s decision to field only four Muslim candidates, all from the Seemanchal region, has been controversial. JDU Working President Sanjay Kumar Jha’s defense, that tickets are given “only where they can win” due to a concentration of “their population in Seemanchal,” is widely interpreted as the final collapse of Nitish’s proclaimed “Secular Saamajik Nyaya Principle.”

These electoral choices follow a pattern of compromises, including the party’s support for the controversial Waqf Amendment Bill, alongside earlier stands on Article 370 and the CAA. This has created a stark contradiction. While the JDU highlights past achievements, such as the Qabristan Gherabandi (graveyard fencing) scheme or its one-time rejection of the NRC-CAA in Bihar, the Muslim community’s critique is sharp: they ask what good graveyard fencing is when Waqf properties are being “slipped out of their hands.”

Furthermore, his apparent “new obedience to Modi” is seen as a betrayal of his earlier anti-NRC stance. This perception is intensified by his main ally, the BJP, which consistently “never misses to show their determination” to drive out “illegal immigrants” through measures like the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls—a process that political experts caution is being used with “malicious intent.”

Collectively, these actions have triggered a final reckoning over the complex “love and war” dynamic between the JDU and Bihar’s Muslims. This article aims to decode the Nitish Kumar phenomenon, his political compulsions, and why the question of whether he is a “friend and foe” appears to have been definitively answered at the close of his long political career, and examines why the Muslim community, despite its numbers, never successfully bargained its essential welfare with Bihar’s biggest political player.

Nitish Kumar’s fading legacy

A significant part of the Nitish Kumar phenomenon was his “Iron Man” image, a leader who, while in an alliance, was never “dictated to by Delhi.” He was seen as a leader who famously cancelled a dinner for Narendra Modi and maintained a posture of regional autonomy. That image now seems to be a relic of the past. In his current tenure, his political posture has visibly weakened in front of the BJP’s top leadership. He often seems to be bowing down, even rushing to touch PM Modi’s feet, and has been seen to “very often express his guilt” for his two previous “betrayals” of the BJP. This public penance, in turn, often puts his own JDU leaders in a “very uncomfortable position” in public.

This perceived weakness is not just posturing. Prof. Mohammad Sajjad (Author of the book, Muslim Politics in Bihar: Changing Contours) of AMU notes the JDU is an “extremely weak party” with “no cadre and no organizational structure.” This weakness is amplified by recent public gaffes and actions that are seen as “crossing ‘decorum’,” creating “uneasiness in the ranks of NDA leaders.” This, as Prof. Sajjad notes, “emboldens the buzz of his poor mental health” and the idea that he is suffering from dementia. This, in turn, strengthens the perception that Nitish Kumar is now a “CM for name only,” with others (presumably the BJP) “actually running the government through back channels.”

Abdullah Azzam (Political analyst & former AMUSU president) is even more direct, stating the JDU is “not in his control” and is being run by “planted” people like Sanjay Jha and leaders who have “become Sanghi,” like Lalan Singh. This political decline is reflected in the BJP’s own strategy. There is a “hesitancy of BJP Leadership,” who, while using Nitish as the face of the NDA in the ongoing elections, has pointedly refused to name him as the Chief Minister if the alliance is voted to power.

A Career of Contradictions

This analysis highlights the central duality of Nitish’s career. While his supporters point to his “secular” work, funding for Madarsas, establishing the Mazharul Haque University (a senior journalist and former editor at The Inquilab, Ahmad Jawed says Lalu Yadav had neglected for 12 years), his critics see a clear pattern of “soft Hindutva.” Sami Ahmad(senior Hindi journalist) notes that while Nitish Kumar’s government gives some money to “shrines and Sufi lodges,” it allocates “far more money” to Hindu religious projects, such as the Punaura Dham in Sitamarhi and the 325-crore rubber dam in Gaya. Even his outreach to the Muslim community is seen by some as politically misguided. Mr. Jawed notes that Nitish made a “mistake” by focusing his outreach on “Maulvis and Peers” rather than empowering genuine political workers, and by trying to cultivate “Extremely Backward” (ati-pichhda) Muslim leaders who had no real influence.

A Failure of Transactional Politics

The analysts agree that this contradiction is not about ideology but about compulsion, and this is where the Muslim community’s failure to bargain becomes clear. Ultimately, Nitish’s politics are seen as purely “transactional.” Prof. Sajjad frames the Waqf bill as a failed transaction, arguing that the Muslim leadership failed to bargain effectively. “Did all Muslim leaders unanimously go to Nitish and promise to ‘divorce Lalu’… if Nitish opposed the BJP on the bill?” Prof. Sajjad asks. “This did not happen.” Because the community’s leadership could not make this bargain, Nitish had no political incentive to take the “big risk” of opposing the BJP.

This analysis extends to the community itself. Prof. Sajjad argues that Hindutva is strengthened when the Muslim community is not “self-introspective” on issues like the Shah Bano case or Instant Triple Talaq, arguing that by trying to “justify” these positions, the community allows Hindutva to “weaponize” them.

Ahmad Jawed agrees, arguing that the Muslim community’s “unwavering loyalty” to Lalu Yadav—what he calls a lack of “political awareness”—is what cost them all political leverage. He believes this led Nitish to become “disappointed”, concluding that Muslims would never leave Lalu, regardless of the work he did for them.

The Arithmetic of Survival

This left Nitish free to pursue his own political arithmetic. Mr. Azzam asserts that the primary conflict in Bihar is not Hindu-Muslim but “Forward vs. Backward,” a political game he says Nitish mastered, even more so than Lalu Yadav, by creating the EBC and Mahadalit categories. However, his power was never absolute. Ahmad Jawed recalls that Nitish’s initial alliance with the BJP (pre-1997) was a “compulsion” because Lalu Yadav had already locked in the Muslim vote by arresting L.K. Advani. His own Koiri/Kurmi base was too small.

Mr. Jawed explains Bihar’s politics as a three-bloc system: the Upper Castes, the Muslim-Yadav combine, and the crucial ~40% EBC (Extremely Backward Classes) bloc. This EBC vote is Nitish’s key asset; it’s not committed and follows him, tipping the scales. This is his value to the BJP.

However, Prof. Sajjad challenges this, arguing that the EBCs aren’t loyal to Nitish personally but are a vulnerable group that aligns with the local dominant caste (Yadav, Bhumihar, etc.) for protection. Therefore, Nitish needs a dominant ally. “Nitish cannot fight alone,” Prof. Sajjad states. “When he does, his EBC base abandons him for the BJP.” This explains his entire career. As Mr. Azzam puts it, his strategy is “to win just enough seats so that no government can be formed without him.”

As Nitish Kumar’s political sun sets, the consensus is clear. He was a pragmatist whose “friendship” was always conditional on his political survival. The Muslim community, locked in its “unwavering loyalty” to his rival, failed to engage in the transactional politics he understood. Now that his survival depends entirely on the BJP, to the point of publicly justifying minimal Muslim representation and supporting legislation seen as a threat, the “foe” side is all that remains visible. This “last inning,” and the decades of his “hyper-political adventure,” seem to be ending with a clear, if painful, answer for the community.

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