Can Muslims Doubt God?

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As Muslims, we pride ourselves in the rationality of our faith. We believe Islam to be truly reasonable. Yet our attitudes to the question of reason and its logical correlate– doubt, are highly problematic and often unexplored. We like to quote various verses from scripture in praise of reason, yet when the situation suits, we are also quick to point out that doubt is a spiritual sickness unbecoming of a believer. Below, we will attempt to explore a few strands of this issue that often go unnoticed.

To explore this theme intelligently, we need to ask: Which doubt are we referring to? Doubting God? Or doubting an ‘argument for the proof of God’? – clearly both are not the same, and in the latter, we are really doubting a certain ‘human’ understanding or expression or interpretation of the supposed proof of God.

Classical Islamic scholarship has always maintained the distinction between the revealed texts (the Quran and authoritative Sunnah) versus human enterprises of understanding and theorizing the various aspects of these texts (this includes various disciplines of knowledge that develop over the course of Islamic history such as Fiqh, Aqeedah, Usool ad Deen, Ulum al Hadith, Ulum al Quran etc). Of these two, the revealed texts have the divine status, while the later disciplines are seen as sincere, though human – and thus inevitably fallible – attempts at deciphering the truth of revelation. Thus, the latter are open to interrogation and change in a way that the former are not. This is a key classical distinction to keep in mind when advising against questioning. It is one thing to question subjective, historically contingent, human understandings of the Divine word and will, and quite another thing to question the Divine word and will itself. Often in our communities, this critical distinction is collapsed, and contingent human interpretations are paraded as absolute and infallible. And any criticism of these interpreters is silenced by branding it as a criticism of God himself. One wonders why our contemporary co-religionists find it so hard to make this simple distinction between the Will of God and their own human wills and wishes. Rather than relinquishing absolute knowledge (and judgment) to Allah – to whom alone it belongs, we claim ‘absolute’ truths, and make ‘ultimate’ judgments about virtually everything – thus taking a share in divinity for ourselves (Shirk!).

Some argue that what we are propagating is not our own understanding, it is in fact God’s understanding itself. What can be said of those who have intimate knowledge of and access to the Divine mind? Perhaps it may be argued, the Prophet had this Divine knowledge and we only follow the prophet. Again, there is a return to the same circular logic. That my understanding is the same as the understanding of the Prophet. Well, how is this established? By summoning forth texts of Hadith that record verbatim the words of the Holy messenger. If we have the texts, what room is there for ‘understanding’? The texts are objective, where does the element of ‘subjective understanding’ enter the picture? One could try to establish whether the texts are indeed authentic – which again is done using a criterion external to the texts themselves viz. the exquisite, though still ‘rational’, methodology developed by human followers of the Prophet in history. It makes little sense to argue for a substitution of human subjectivity/rationality by a purportedly objective text, which itself is established as such only through human subjectivity/rationality.

Yet even if we were to disregard this critical nuance, it would still be untenable to argue that my understanding can be the same as the understanding of the Prophet. Not because the Prophet’s case was unique and distinct from that of all other Muslims – which is certainly a significant aspect of it. But because of the simple fact that no one person’s understanding/interpretation/view can be the same as that of any other. Each human being has been endowed with a unique subjectivity/understanding/point of view.

Now, having accepted all these points, one could still contend that this does not mean that we are not allowed any part in the authority of deciding what God’s will is. It can be argued that we have been endowed specially by God to carry this authority in the form of ‘heirs/successors’ to the Prophet and his authority. Thus, the community of scholars that have shaped Islamic intellectual history have been divinely sanctioned to do so. The authority is with the Ulema and the classical Ulum (knowledge). Now, this is a slightly more sophisticated point than the earlier view that saw itself as having direct access to God through the revealed texts, in disregard to the tradition that mediates these texts to us. Undoubtedly, this extra-textual tradition is the medium through which we read and decipher the revealed texts. It is through these later developed Ulum that we engage with the Original texts themselves. Clearly here we see the re-emergence of that classical distinction of authority made between the original texts and the later Ulum that developed in response to decipher these texts and make them speak to the realities of various societies. Already we see here emerging a social and historical element to the eternal discourse of God. And it is precisely this distinction that should always keep us alert and critical of how and why we read God’s will in a one way and not in another. It is both an intellectual and spiritual error to assume a simplistic equation between the eternal speech of God and the historically and socially contested and consolidated discourses that have shaped its understandings.

Thus, to be faithful to the revealed texts demands an uncompromising intellectual rigor. The intellect is necessary to serve God. The intellect thus helps us sift between the various and often contested discourses around the word of God. Without respect for the intellect, without commitment to rationality, we are left like sheep who blindly follow wherever any shepherd leads us. By choosing to lead such a life, devoid of an ever vigilant reason, we are doing a disservice to both ourselves and to Allah.

Now, we have only been scratching the surface of this multi-layered cocoon of anti-rationality that we as Muslims have grown so comfortable with. Suppose all the above points are accepted as fairly reasonable, there is still the issue of the ‘dangers of reason’. It is supposed that if we give free reign to reason, then anything and everything can be justified. There is the assumption that accepting the primacy of rationality would mean a kind of ‘absolute relativism’ – everything can be true, so everything can be false. If everyone is entitled to an opinion, then no one really is. This is based on an irrational view of rationality. True, the horrors of absolute relativism are harrowing, and it may have its proponents as a philosophy of knowledge. However, this is hardly how philosophy works. In fact, in philosophy, not every opinion is valid. Even if philosophy generally cannot come towards a single view in most philosophical matters (simply because we are not Allah – we are not Omniscient.), it is not by any means a kind of ‘everything goes’ field. It is a discipline of knowledge – it is often a meta-discipline, i.e. a discipline about disciplines – that demands robust rules of logic and reasoning – quite often mirroring mathematical precision. Not any opinion is valid, it is only a logical and a reasoned opinion that gains validity. Now someone might contest that we have no right to assume these ‘rules of logic’ to be universal or absolute – that logic too, may be a biased science. In fact, this is a critical theme in post-modern studies, in post-colonial studies, in critical theory etc. For example, some of the logic systems that developed in India are remarkably different from other ‘Western’ logic systems (which interestingly were to be significantly developed in the Muslim world – even anti-logicians like Ibn Taymiyya were in fact only contributing to an alternate theory of logic as against the popular Greek-Hellenistic logic.) However, should we now suppose that because there are different logic systems, therefore any search for a universal grammar of logic is absurd? Isn’t this another form of ‘absolute relativism’ or ‘nihilism’ even? The only reasonable position would be to uphold the validity of reason and rationality while acknowledging the reality of contestations about reason and rationality itself. This is the mistaken view many outsiders take, that because philosophy is difficult or even arcane, therefore it is completely pointless. This is the view preferred by those with an ‘all-or-nothing’ attitude. We want all the answers or nothing at all. That apart from complete certainty, there is only a mindless sea of doubt. This approach fails to acknowledge the various stages in between these two extremes. It fails to see that reality is not at any one extreme but may in fact be on the many intermediate coordinates between these two poles. One wonders why we humans are so susceptible to such ‘all-or-nothing’ thinking. Certainly, the ideals of both absolute certainty, and absolute doubt, are much more comforting than the messy reality in between the two. Ego again gets in the way of clear-thinking. Ego is when we imagine things to be a certain way, and are adamant in our imagination, so that we close our minds (and hearts) to honest provocation (which is always painful and uncomfortable). Which is why rationality and philosophy demand a project of ‘self-purification'(tazkiyat un nafs). Since the ego is a potent obstacle to clear, objective thinking, ‘self-purification’ and mastery over the lower self, has always been an important prerequisite for philosophy and theology. The ancient Greeks demanded it. Medieval Muslims demanded it. Knowledge was seen as a pointless venture, if it did not succeed in inspiring a purification of the self, and in becoming a fuel for positive action in society. So, the view that the path of philosophy or thinking or rationality or reason is anti-spiritual or anti-religious or anti-social, is an inaccurate cliché that must be discarded if we want to engage the heart of the matter and not merely comfort ourselves with our ‘refutations of philosophy’. An anti-philosophical or anti-rational view is still another, though antagonistic, philosophical or rational point of view. The view that there is no place for reason, is also a view that is reasoned for. It would take sheer hard-headedness not to recognize this much.

Having dealt with these underlying assumptions, we may now return to our discussion of negotiating the revealed texts viz a viz reason. Once we acknowledge the critical importance of engaging with the revealed texts, we cannot but acknowledge simultaneously the need for an engagement with the intellectual tradition in history that has carried these texts and brought them to us in their present form. We also acknowledge the fallibility of this human endeavour against the infallibility of the revealed texts themselves. To put it this way may risk downplaying or even belittling the critical value of tradition. To do away with one’s intellectual predecessors is not to have braved and solved their problems, but to have fled from the intellectual battlefield itself. It is a cop-out, as self-reassuring as the other extreme of discarding reason or critical thinking altogether. It cannot be emphasized enough how vital the canon of tradition is to any engagement with the revealed texts. However, while being respectful to our intellectual predecessors, we must avoid at all costs, the hazard of using traditional dogma as a balm to numb our own reason and conscience. Only we are responsible for our thoughts and actions. We can take the help of various intellectual guides, but it is ultimately we that must take responsibility for ourselves. And there is no version of being responsible, without an alert, critical, inquisitive, and active mind. We cannot escape the conclusion, that even amidst our choice between various scholarly opinions, we have ultimately to rely on our individual reason as the arbitrator.

Even though we may rely on expert opinions to help us in understanding, it is ultimately using our own reason that we choose or reject various positions.

Now, to the most pressing question of all, what if the view of an ‘expert/specialist’ clashes with our own view? Does it demand complete deference to the authority of the specialist? Well, that would depend on a host of factors. Firstly, what is our own justification? Is it a ‘reasoned’ one? Or is it a sentimental one? Now, the fact that it is sentimental, and not reasoned, does not necessarily imply that it is therefore wishful thinking. Certainly, our emotions and passions can be for vain desires. However, one can also be passionate about spiritual values – values we may not necessarily be able to rationally elucidate, but that have emanated from the purity of one’s soul. And we as Muslims, should certainly not be quick to disregard such an epistemology, since we believe in the original purity and wholesomeness of the soul, upon which God created it (the Fitrah). The pure soul/heart/mind (these are overlapping terms in the Quran) is an important indicator of what is right and wrong, true and false. We do not need to be told that injustice and oppression are wrong. We know it in our hearts. In fact, if we are of the persuasion not to trust this most basic moral intuition until it is buttressed with some theological or Islamic or Fiqhi evidences, then we are inhabiting a dangerous moral zone. If we require an Islamic textual evidence for believing that oppression is wrong, then we are morally in deep water. The demand for equality is one such imperative of justice. That men and women be given equal opportunity and respect – intellectually and emotionally. That women be empowered with not just the ‘freedom’ but the education to make their own choices. For freedom with ignorance is no freedom at all. Before any fair conversation of gender roles and relationships can be meaningfully had, we need the partners in the conversation to be on equal footing – without which any pretence of ‘women empowerment’ is a disguise for the same patriarchal power dynamics. Now it is easy to dismiss such talk as ‘feminist’ or ‘liberal’ or ‘modern’ – as Muslims we have been in the habit of avoiding discussion by resorting to tactics of labelling and grouping these ideas as ‘other’ or ‘western’ or ‘irrelevant’. Whatever position we choose to adopt, certainly such childish tactics are unbecoming of us as people with a Book, and a people of mutual-engagement (‘li ta’arafu’ as Surah Hujarat says). Our faith requires us to always uphold the principle of justice – even if it is against ourselves. To do justice to an idea, we must at least give it the respect of our attention and intellect and avoid the easier tactic of labelling and discarding.

This may have seemed beside the point, but I doubt it, since such play of rhetoric often muddles our intellectual engagements and so it is necessary that we remove these obstacles from the path of clear and honest thinking.

Just because certain moral intuitions are controversial does not make them any less legitimate. If fascism becomes morally controversial, it does not take away from all the moral abhorrence you may have of it. The truth of these moral intuitions is within one’s heart, (as is their falsehood). And so, it is God alone who may judge the sincerity and genuineness of any such deeply personal source of knowledge.

It remains however the case, that controversy, difference and dissent are the social realities even with such personal ethical intuitions. And so publicly, ethics will need to be meted out in the only reasonable way: through reasoning. It is in the domain of public reason, that issues of ethics can be negotiated with respect to the various parties involved. And it is to the arena of public reason that one must look to, if one wishes to persuade alternative moral standpoints towards one’s own. What other means of persuasion is there if not a reasoned one? A coerced one?

Now, public reason is not necessarily secular reason – although it certainly must be reckoned with when considering one’s larger human framework. However, even within the Islamic discourse, we deal with a public reason which engages various extra-textual sources of morality. These include the moral intuitions that emanate from the Fitrah (primordial nature), the common sense (the ma’ruf) that is a part of any decent culture and an openness to inspiration from one’s larger human heritage. These factors will play a vital role in how we form our ethics, whether we attribute their origins to the proper source or not. This is the case because we do not inhabit sanitary, water-tight compartments. Rather we are constantly swimming in a sea supplied by numerous rivers and where the waters mix, often beyond recognition.

It is in this sea that our scriptures are drenched, and it is this sea that becomes the ink of all our opinions – whatever their source. In other words, the moral field is complex, and relies on various moral springs, scripture being just one of them. Any discourse that seeks to close off all the other channels to this vast sea in the name of ‘purity of origin’, will not only end up depriving the sea of its vibrant colour and flavour, but also sentencing to death a huge portion of aquatic life that used to thrive there.

But if the moral field is so complex, how are we to decide what to follow? And how are we to draw the line between contesting frontiers? How would we know what to do and when? What to leave and what to hold onto?

This is indeed a complex question. Perhaps it is the most relevant question we need to be asking ourselves. And perhaps it does not bear of a simple or even universal answer. It may be something we need to figure out for ourselves based on the sources of our moral sea – we may need to switch between the river channels supplying us, we may need to weed out some aquatic flora to make it possible for some other to flourish. Perhaps we may find ourselves more comfortable close to certain channels than others. But we better not let our affinities for particular rivulets, make us lose sight of the sea ahead of us.

But perhaps you aren’t persuaded by this mushy metaphor of the sea. And are still probably trying to situate where this metaphor or anything else I’ve been saying, is found in the Quran and Sunnah? And you are free to disagree. But I hope I have convinced you at the very least, that even to take any viewpoint – rational or anti-rational – would still require a thorough rational interrogation and inquiry. And that any choice you make also presupposes a freedom where you could decide between either choice. And perhaps it is this freedom or openness that we need to acknowledge first and foremost, before proclaiming any position. It is this openness that allows us to see the contested intellectual landscape for what it is. It allows us to weigh the various options and to consider them on our own. It is precisely this willingness to be openminded, to let the evidence be the arbitrator, even if it is against one’s self or one’s most cherished beliefs – to follow where the evidence leads, and to not lead the evidence to what I follow – this is nothing other than that robust exercise in intellectual spirituality, commonly called ‘Doubt’. This is the doubt we need. This is the doubt necessary for any reasonable faith. Anything else is blind conformism.

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